

AIR NIUGINI
GROUND
OPERATIONS &
AVIATION
SECURITY

Air Niugini Aviation Security Monthly Bulletin

PHILIPPIANS
4:13-WE CAN DO
ALL THINGS
THROUGH
CHRIST JESUS
WHO IS OUR
STRENGTH

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FEBRUARY, 2015
ISSUE

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Aviation Security-Historical Context

In this column, we take a look back in time in aviation history when aircrafts began to be used as weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and the lone suicidal individuals with isolated agendas. Here is an excerpt from a security incident investigation report into a bombing incident involving a major US airline a decade ago, that puts us into perspective with aviation security as we discover our role in the aviation security chain link.

On September 11, 2001, four American passenger jets were hijacked in a coordinated terrorist attack. Two were flown into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York City. The third aircraft struck the Pentagon building in Arlington, Virginia, while the fourth, possibly destined for an attack on the White House, crashed into a field southeast of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. These attacks represented a fundamental change in aviation terrorism. Never before had aircraft been successfully used as guided missiles in a sophisticated suicide mission. Existing measures for aviation security proved ineffective.

There was a popular misconception that this was the first time terrorists had orchestrated an incident using multiple aircraft. In fact, the first coordinated incident involved Dawson’s Field, an abandoned airstrip in the Jordanian desert, some 30 years earlier. It was organized by Leila Khaled, a prominent leader within the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The group planned to hijack three aircraft, representing different countries and departing from different locations, and then direct them to Dawson’s Field.

On September 6, 1970, 6 members of the group successfully took over a Swissair Coronado aircraft and a Trans World Airlines (TWA) 707 and flew them to Dawson’s Field. The plan also included an attack on an El Al aircraft, which involved Khaled herself. She flew from Germany with a fellow PFLP member and they transferred to the El Al flight in Amsterdam. Two others were to join them on this mission, but the flight was overbooked and the two were unable to secure seats. Instead, they seized a Pan American (Pan Am) Boeing 747 and flew it to Cairo, where the aircraft was destroyed by explosives following its evacuation.

Although Khaled and her companion continued with their El Al hijacking plans, they were unsuccessful. Guards on board the El Al flight intervened, her companion was shot and Khaled was taken into custody in London, the destination to which the aircraft had been diverted. In immediate response, other members of the PFLP hijacked a British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) aircraft, and it joined the other commandeered planes at Dawson’s Field. About 300 hostages were held in the desert during negotiations for the release of terrorists detained in several European countries. The terrorists achieved their objectives and the passengers were released unharmed.

This was a highly successful coordinated terrorist attack. It is generally considered to represent the birth of modern air terrorism.

The terrorists in the Dawson’s Field incident wanted to make a political statement, but they also wanted to emerge alive, unlike those involved in the events of September 11th. The civil aviation community had considered the possibility of terrorists seizing and exploding aircraft over major world capitals with the intent of “raining terror from the skies.” Even so, the “disposable” terrorist who sacrificed his or her life in the attack was not considered a serious possibility before 2001.

Successful suicidal hijackers were also not completely unheard of before the September 11th attacks. On December 10, 1987, a disgruntled former US Air employee hijacked a US Air aircraft. He shot the pilot, sending the aircraft into a dive and crash that left no survivors among the 43 people on board. Suicide for-insurance schemes were a feature of aviation sabotage in the 1950s and 60s. These incidents, however, involved “the fringe element” – suicidal individuals with isolated agendas – whose behaviour was random and very different from that of “...a group of people planning and carrying out a mass attack. Aviation security measures should of course be designed to protect against both suicidal individuals and those intent on carrying out a mass attack

Aviation Security Regulations/Procedures

Failed To Board - Passenger/Baggage Reconciliation

References manuals for procedure:

Security Manual v15.0 01 July 2014

- 3.7.6 - Passenger / Baggage Reconciliation
- 5.29.3 - Fail To Board
- 3.26 - Non Off-Loading of Passengers' Baggage

Airport Services Manual v12.0

- 4.17.1 - Passenger and Baggage Handling
- 4.17.1 (2A) - Passenger and Baggage Handling
- 5.10.5 - Baggage Reconciliation Process

Ground Handling and Weight & Balance Manual - B767 v3.1

- 5.18 - Failure To Board - Baggage Off-load
- 9.3.2 - Load Reconciliation

Incident Description (Occurrence # 0255-14)

Friday the 2nd of May, 2014, a passenger confirmed to travel on Air Niugini's international flight PX 010 to Manila on P2 – PXW (B767) fails to board the flight, and his luggage is not off-loaded.

This is a violation to set procedures as stipulated in the Ground Handling and Weight & Balance Manual – B767 in Section 5.18 Failure to Board – Baggage Of-

fload, which clearly states that “In every case where a passenger has checked in (including transit and transfer passengers) for flight, and does not board or in the case of a transit passenger, fails to re – board the flight, the aircraft shall not depart until all items of baggage of the passenger concerned have been located and removed from the aircraft.”

Ramp officers were advised to locate the bag, and 10 minutes into the search they advised that the bag could not be located and assumed it to have been mis-loaded.. During the course of the search, the Pilot in Command was never made aware the FTB scenario.


An attempt to pre alert the information regarding the FTB luggage to final destination was also not transmitted creating some security concerns when detected in Manila.

Given the present day cases and reports of terrorist attack, suicide bombers, this could have resulted in something serious because procedures were not followed properly.

Aviation Security Statistics for 2014


SECURITY OCCURRENCES

Security occurrences for the year 2014 as recorded by the security compliance team. Records from safety office are also compared and risk mitigation is carried out as well. Corrective and Preventative actions are highlighted and implemented with areas of concern.



PORT INSPECTIONS & ASSESSMENTS


The AVSEC Compliance team carries out monthly inspections of all domestic ports per the PX Air Operators Security Program (AOSP). This is to continuously mitigate risks in our operational fronts and identify vulnerabilities that may expose the airline to preventable incidences/accidents.



AUDIT FINDINGS

Audit findings for the year 2014 tabulated in graphical format highlighting root causes which ground operations and security management continuously address both at operational and administrative levels.

Open communication and reporting is also carried out on a weekly basis with corporate quality and safety department to mitigate and oversight risks pertaining to our operational areas.



Security is Everyone's Business



Air Niugini

The Management Team of Ground Operations & Aviation Security Department formally commend and congratulate the following staff for their excellent performance in their respective areas in the month of January, 2015.

Bomb Threat Joke.

Date: 25 January 2015

A passenger named, Mr. Guise Solomon on flight PX005 to Brisbane was denied boarding the aircraft for using the word "**BOMB**" at the LAGS check point.

Senior security officer **Mr. Kevin Nagami** while doing LAGS checks asked the passenger to open his electrical calibration case for a physical check, when the passenger said, "**he was carrying a bomb**". Kevin advised him to stand aside while he checked the remaining passengers through later referring the passenger to his supervisor and the Avsec Ops Manager, who was at that time monitoring the officers with their checks.

The International Terminal Manager was then advised to deny passenger from travelling, because he had mentioned "bomb" which is considered a bomb threat whether factious or in a joking manner

He was taken to the immigration office where his travel arrangement was removed from the system and later brought up to the Avsec Investigation office together with the terminal's Australian immigration attaché', Mr. Peter Marchei. Due to the nature of the threat, Mr Peter Marchei called the Australia immigration office in Canberra and the passenger's visa was cancelled.

The passenger is from Hula, Central Province and is an electrical engineer with the LCS electrical company, and was going abroad for a job training course.

Security Manual. v15

4.5.5.4 Threat Recipient

Threat Received In Person

1. Bomb threats received verbally in person are uncommon. In such cases an evaluation of the individual making the threat will assist in determining its validity.
2. Factors to be considered should include:
 - Disgruntled passenger.
 - Whether under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
 - Threat made in facetious or joking manner.
3. The person receiving the threat will:
 - (a) Notify Supervisor / Manager.
 - (b) Keep person talking as long as possible noting words used and his / her physical description.
 - (c) If person departs, note direction of travel and advise local Police accordingly. Where possible keep person under observation.



AVSEC Officer-Kevin Nagami

Security (Operations) Briefing



Security Officers Parade - 30/01/15



Airport Coordinator - Steven Gena, IIO/Emergency Coordinator, Peter Lawrence and Investigation Supervisor, Sammy Kasa briefing officers before deployment.

A security parade is carried out before shift deployment to ensure officers are on time for duty, in the company dress code, daily operational issues are highlighted for awareness and any other operational matters are disseminated through this forum to all AVSEC officers.